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HOW TO DETECT ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
by ROBERT S. KAY

Much has been said about the auditor's responsibility—
often pronounced "guarantee"—for the adequacy of
financial statement disclosures. This is particularly true concerning those transactions that are regarded as lining the
wallets of insiders, to the possible detriment of shareholders and creditors. But is there also a role for the financial executive with respect to these related party transactions now in the news?
The seriousness of charges recently levied at not only
independent accountants but also corporate directors and
officers, including financial officers, should prompt us to
evaluate what the financial executive can do—indeed,
should do.
The responsibility for adequate disclosure of related
party transactions is not a new issue. Financial executives of
publicly held companies know that information required
by the SEC must be contained in SEC filings, whether or not
the information is also included in the financial statements. It is at least debatable, therefore, whether a company's financial statements are "complete" or "adequate"
when they do not disclose related party transactions, even if
that disclosure is elsewhere within the filing.
How much information should be contained in the financial statements, including the footnotes? If none, what obligation is there to disclose these transactions with related
parties in documents filed with regulatory authorities? Is
there no guide to follow?
Financial executives, you're in luck! But you may not
have recognized it, because the source of your good
fortune is contained in a recent Statement on Auditing
Standards (SAS) issued by the AICPA's Auditing Standards
Executive Committee (AudSEC), It has been said that SASs
are written for auditors only. Right? Wrong! Indeed, I
would recommend highly that financial executives be
familiar with SASs, since they guide the independent CPA
who performs the audit of his company. In this instance, it is
SAS 6, "Related Party Transactions,"that suggests the auditing standards and disclosure specifications that the financial executive should be alert to.

O n the basis of what may not be an auditor's responsibility could well be a responsibility of the financial executive, J will discuss here SAS 6 (effective for financial statements for periods ending on or after December 26,1975),

and a Touche Ross Technical Letter, issued in 1974, on
"Management Involvement in Material Transactions."
The SAS describes steps designed to (1) identify related
party transactions and (2) audit the substance of such transactions, including financial statement disclosures. Naturally, for the auditor to be satisfied in these areas, so must be
the financial executive who is responsible for preparing the
financial statements.
Overview of SAS 6
The SAS does not apply to intercompany transactions that
are eliminated when consolidated financial statements are
presented. This is obvious. O n the other hand, when
separate financial statements of components are presented, intercomponent transactions generally are not
eliminated, and the provisions of SAS 6 are certainly then
applicable.
W h o is a related party? The SAS definition includes the
reporting entity, its affiliates, principal owners, management and members of their immediate families, and APB
Opinion 18 investors and investees. It also covers any other
party with whom the reporting entity may deal, when that
party's influence extends to the ability to prevent the
reporting entity from fully pursuing its own interests. Included, too, are situations in which entities dealing with
each other are both susceptible to influence by a third
party, such as when a series of companies are subject to the
owner's discretion concerning which company shall
handle a particular transaction.
Note that even though some transactions are not given
accounting recognition, they are nonetheless related party
transactions. For example, a parent company may provide
services to a subsidiary without charge.
Excluded from related party transactions are situations in
which a company is economically dependent on one or
more parties with which it does a significant amount of
business—such as a supplier, franchiser, distributor,
general agent, borrower, or lender. W h i l e these parties are
not related parties—there is not a significant management
or ownership influence—disclosure of economic dependency may be necessary in the financial statements.
The cardinal rule in SAS 6 is that "established accounting
7
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principles ordinarily do not require transactions with related parties to be accounted for on a basis different from
that which would be appropriate if the parties were not related." For now, primary emphasis is therefore placed on
the adequacy of disclosure, as well as on the substance of a
transaction rather than its form being given accounting
recognition.
M u c h of the SAS deals with three broad audit areas:
—Determining the existence of related parties.
—Identifying transactions with related parties.
—Examining identified related party transactions.
A financial executive w h o knows what his auditor is now
required to achieve is obviously better prepared to provide him with the necessary material. But beyond that, he
should take an " a u d i t o r " type interest in information
generated by his accounting systems and summarized into
financial statements. How else can he really satisfy himself
concerning the veracity of the information presented?
Here are highlights he should be familiar with from the
audit procedures section of SAS 6:
• Documentation for related party transactions—or at
least those exceeding a certain materiality threshold—
should be agreed upon between the company and the
auditor.
The auditor should be aware that there could also be
undisclosed material related party transactions. In assessing a company's propensity for such undisclosed transactions, the CPA must understand management's responsibilities, and the extent of controls over management
activities.
• Primary emphasis is placed on auditing material transactions with parties the auditor knows are related parties.
After the auditor has identified material transactions
with known related parties, he is also asked to identify
material transactions that may be indicative of the existence of previously undetermined relationships.
The auditor is also asked to examine related party
transactions to establish their purpose, nature, and extent,
and their impact o n the financial statement. There is a
particularly interesting footnote: " U n t i l the auditor understands the business sense of material transactions, he cannot complete his examination."
» Some additional procedures not common today are
going to be implemented more and more. Auditors will
more regularly:
—Confirm the transaction amount and terms with the other
parties.
—Inspect evidence held by the other parties.
—Confirm or discuss with intermediaries, such as banks,
guarantors, agents or attorneys.
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^ O b t a i n information regarding the financial capability of
the other parties.
—Look to any unusual information source they can think of
when they have some reason to suspect a material transaction to be lacking substance (obviously, an openended procedure).
The "additional procedures" just described apply not
only to related party transactions. Literally, they apply to
any material transactions. This is a major fault, in the view of
Touche Ross, with the SAS, for it keeps switching between
related party transactions and material transactions. It must
be read very carefully so that the auditor will not walk by his
obligation with respect to material transactions, even if
there is no evidence of a related party being involved.
Likewise, the financial executive has to realize that, even if
he believes there are no related party transactions, the
auditor still has to do a great deal of work, and be provided
with considerable information, with respect to material
transactions.

How Does SAS 6 Impact Financial Executives?
W h a t are the responsibilities of a financial executive in relation to what is basically a directive to auditors? Consider the
following:
The financial executive has a responsibility to maintain an adequate system of internal control in order to (1)
identify those related party transactions which will be
acceptable within the normal operating activities of the
company; (2) prevent (or quickly identify) those that are
not so acceptable; and (3) produce adequate documentation. Because related party transactions often occur at the
highest management levels, however, it is difficult to devise
a system of internal controls which will ring bells when a
related party transaction is occurring. Since the top echelon of management is ultimately accountable to the owners
of the business through the directors, it would seem advisable to have a strong representation of outside directors on
the board. This would help to assure the board's objectivity when dealing with the acceptability of related party
transactions involving top management.
In the area of standards for related party transactions,
the last word has certainly not been written. W h i l e the
financial executive must remain alert to all possible questionable practices by his company, he is hampered by lack
of standards in the same way the auditor is.
• The financial executive simply cannot record transactions without satisfying himself that authentic backup
material exists. Any auditor doing his job properly will ask
for it.
• The financial executive is responsible for adequate

financial statement disclosure, including SEC-required disclosures where appropriate. H e is also responsible if the
substance of a transaction would require recording in some
way other than the form of the transaction.

Disclosure of Related Party Transactions
SAS 6 deals extensively with disclosure and, tangentially,
with accounting considerations. Disclosure of a material related party transaction must include:
—The nature of the relationship.
— A description of the transactions for the period being reported, including amounts, and "such other information as is deemed necessary for an understanding of
the effects on the financial statements." Note the openended nature of this subjective requirement.
—The dollar volume of transactions and the effect of any
change in the method of establishing terms (such as in a
parent/subsidiary relationship, where the customary
transfer price may have been significantly changed to suit
the convenience—perhaps tax planning objectives—of
the parties).
—Amounts due to or from related parties, and (if not otherwise apparent) the terms and manner of settlement.
A very controversial paragraph deals with equivalence
disclosures in financial statements. SAS 6indicates: "Except
for routine transactions, it will generally not be possible to
determine whether a particular transaction would have
taken place if the parties had not been related, or assuming
it would have taken place, what the terms and manner of
settlement would have been." This premise strongly suggests that companies should not report in their financial
statements that a related party transaction was consummated on an arm's-length basis, because that is impossible
by definition. Nonetheless, a fair number of equivalence
disclosures do exist in practice, and the SAS requires that if
the auditor is unable to reach a conclusion concerning the
accuracy of the equivalence statement, he should amend
his report accordingly.
The trouble with that conclusion is that it is only a partial
conclusion. The way it is written leaves out:
—Any indication of whether the company has made a comparison of the related party transaction with a similar
arm's-length transaction, and what the results of such
comparison were. Some companies do set transfer
pricing, for example, on the basis of market prices. If this
is done, the auditor should know it. Most particularly, if
the company has made such a comparison and does not
report a significant disparity between market prices and
prices actually used, and if the auditor does not raise any
objection to that situation, it is valid to question whether

the financial statements present all the necessary information or whether they are misleading.
—Any explicit requirement that the auditor pursue an
intuitive feeling about a material transaction not being
equivalent to a similar arm's-length transaction.
W h i l e l o u c h e Ross agrees there can be no related party
transaction on an arm's-length basis by definition, w e also
believe that disclosure should be made if there is a substantial disparity between the terms of a related party transaction and a similar arm's-length transaction. In some
respects, accounting recognition might be given to such
significant differences, because they would raise a question concerning the substance of the transaction. Many
auditors believe that this is the import of SAS 6.
Every informed financial executive knows that little in the
way of accounting prescription exists in the official literature with respect to related party transactions. Even SAS 6
suggests its desperation by saying that, "until such time as
applicable accounting principles are established by appropriate authoritative bodies . . .," primary emphasis has to
be placed on the adequacy of disclosure and on reporting
the substance of related party transactions.
It is interesting to note that the recent FASB Exposure
Draft on Accounting for Leases has this to say about leases
between related parties: the leases should be reckoned the
same as leases with unrelated parties but "modified as
necessary in the circumstances in recognition of accounting principles generally applying to transactions between
related parties."

W e have asked the FASB to either delete or expand on
this statement, because to our knowledge there aren't any
such accounting principles, unless SAS 6 is looked upon as
providing them. In any event, an exposure draft on leases is
a rather remote place to bury accounting principles for related party disclosure.

The Touche Ross Approach
W e are all aware of recent notorious management frauds.
In many instances, undisclosed or misassessed related party
transactions were underneath these frauds. SAS 6 is a subtle
response to this situation. A year earlier, Touche Ross prepared a booklet with a purpose similar to that of SAS 6; it
was called "Management Involvement in Material Transactions,"
Of course, the terminology "related party transactions"
is somewhat euphemistic—just like "management involvement in material transactions." Neither of these titles
includes the vernacular term "management fraud," but
both documents clearly embrace it. However, in our booklet, w e cover it directly, while the SAS simply covers it by in9
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ference. That is, the word " f r a u d " is not used in the entire
SAS. This, w e think, is a disservice to all involved in the presentation of financial statements. Since they are not privy to
all AudSEC meeting discussions, the obliqueness of the SAS
may impair its understanding.
The Touche Ross approach is more structured than is that
of SAS 6. Its focal point, for audit purposes, is the identification of material transactions. These are defined generally in terms of percentages relative to the financial statements. This is not ironclad, because obviously qualitative
factors have to be taken into account. W e think that a good
way for the financial executive to deal with SAS 6 is to identify and schedule all the material transactions included in a
set of financial statements. By focusing on material transactions, he is likely to cover the transactions encompassed
by SAS 6.
There are other differences between the Touche Ross
booklet and SAS 6 to keep in mind:
—The Touche Ross booklet offers an extensive discussion
of conducive economic factors and business structures.
The SAS offers only a brief discussion of economic factors and simply mentions in passing the questions of business structure,
—The Touche Ross document includes SEC definitions of
management that fall within its definition of related
parties, and it presents excerpts from professional literature on the topic of related parties.
— A s indicated earlier, Touche Ross requires some inquiry
into arm's-length equivalence. It is at least debatable
whether the SAS calls for this.
— I n the area of documentation, Touche Ross offers specific requirements about needed work papers, memoranda, and audit programs. The SAS specifies only that
the auditor must obtain sufficient competent evidential
matter (other than representations of management) to
properly evaluate related party transactions and their
effects on the financial statements.
—Finally, Touche Ross has included some quantitative
materiality criteria in its document.
In large measure, Touche Ross covers a number of
auditing and accounting topics, and one wouldn't really expect to see all this covered in a single SAS, because of inherent jurisdictional limitations on its content.
W h a t difficulties has Touche Ross encountered as a result
of its one-year head start on SAS 6?
Here are a few highlights:
• It would be braggadocio to say that w e have uncovered numerous management frauds as a result of
applying these procedures. O h yes, w e have found a few,
but who is to say they wouldn't have been found anyway?
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After all, when one realizes that the fundamental proposition of SAS 6 is understanding the client's business in
order to see if the material transactions make sense, the
substance of the SAS becomes interwoven throughout the
entire audit, and it is never really determinable whether the
resulting audit conclusions can be directly identified with
one or another procedure.

W e did, however, find quite a few related party transactions that we had not consciously addressed in the past.
No doubt this was due to a more consistent definition of a
related party.
* Touche Ross requires confirmation of the terms of all
material transactions, whereas SAS 6 indicates this is one of
those "additional procedures." As might be expected,
some clients felt they were justified in not wanting these
confirmations sent. In all fairness, the financial executives
understood our audit needs, and wanted to be cooperative. The difficulties were mostly encountered at the chief
operating officer level. O u r conclusion is that the advantages of sending the confirmation outweigh the risk of a low
reliability response.
Perhaps most significant, Touche Ross found that
applying auditing for related party transactions to the
smaller, closely held companies is the most difficult. As a
generalization, closely held businesses may not be too concerned about the distinctions between company transactions and owner transactions. The president or chairman
of the smaller closely held client, not understanding the
contemporary clamor about management fraud and related parties, has often argued vociferously against the
auditor's need to apply SAS 6 to that particular audit engagement, plus the additional audit costs it would entail.

Conclusion
All auditors are now applying SAS 6 on related party transactions to 1975 calendar year audits. No doubt they are
having start-up difficulties, because the SAS is not a cookbook. As the auditor is having difficulties, so will financial
executives—in assessing their own responsibilities, and in
complying sincerely with the new procedures required by
auditors.
The lack of accounting specification has never been a sufficient defense in the courts when misleading financial
statements have been asserted to exist. Although accounting specification is improving, it will be necessary for the
financial executive and the auditor to work closely in
identifying related party transactions. Their cooperation is
also required in deciding what concise, yet complete, disclosure should be given in response to such situations in a
particular company's financial statements.
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